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Available online 2 June 2016In the last two decades, the Payment for Ecosystem Services
(PES) tool has largely spread across the globe as an approach to
address biodiversity loss and ecosystem services degradation
(Wunder, 2015). The role of the State in PES programs varies
from active buyer of ES, on behalf of ES beneﬁciaries, to regu-
lator. A well-structured legal framework is deﬁned as crucial
for scaling positive results up of PES initiatives (Greiber, 2009;
Stanton, 2014). However, little attention has been given to the
political aspects behind the development of PES regulations,
an important piece to guarantee PES functioning. In develop-
ing countries, political interests may play an important role
in PES legislation establishment compromising its ﬁnal goals.
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article  under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licin Brazil and address the challenges faced by Santa Catarina
state to get off the ground its PES policy.
Around eight publications discussing PES concepts have
been presented by Matzdorf et al. (2013) and at least two  other
recent ones might be added (Noordwijk and Leimona, 2010;
Wunder, 2015). Here, the concept followed deﬁnes PES as a
“transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to
create incentives to align individual and/or collective land use
decisions with the social interest in the management of nat-
ural resources” (Muradian et al., 2010).
Within this framework, Governments can assume the role
of ecosystem service (ES) “buyer” and/or of a legal actor. In
the ﬁrst case, Governments are responsible for ﬁnancing or
co-ﬁnancing PES programs, what is generally observed for
non-rival and non-excludable services, such as habitat for bio-
diversity and climate regulation (Jack et al., 2008; Kemkes et al.,
2010). In the second, Governments can establish regulation
for compensation payments within the environment impact
vac¸a˜o. Published by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access
enses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
























































tion, priority areas deﬁnition and PES projects monitoring is
overseen by a committee, formed just by ﬁve representatives,n a t u r e z a & c o n s e r v a
ssessment framework (EIA) and others, and deﬁne proper
egulations for PES programs in local, regional and national
evels (Matzdorf et al., 2013).
The role of the State and the development of an appropri-
te legal framework are considered critical for PES to properly
unction (Balvanera et al., 2012; Farley and Costanza, 2010;
reiber, 2009; Richards et al., 2015). However, it is known that
ome of the legislation supporting PES are poorly designed
ue to the lack of technical capacity and their susceptibil-
ty to political pressures (Pattanayak et al., 2010; Pirard, 2012;
under et al., 2008). Political interest can play a major role
n the design and implementation of PES programs, pushing
cosystem service provision and/or improvement into sec-
nd place (Engel et al., 2008; Greiber, 2009; Pattanayak et al.,
010). Examples of political inﬂuence in PES design and imple-
entation have been observed in Mexico (Alix-garcia et al.,
005; Corbera et al., 2009), Costa Rica (Pagiola, 2008), Indonesia
Pirard, 2012) and Brazil (Tejeiro and Stanton, 2014).
Within Brazil, PES policies emerged in the last decade
nspired by other pioneer experiences across Latin America.
he ﬁrst PES program was launched in 2001 in the municipal-
ty of Extrema, Minas Gerais state. The legal framework used
as the National Water Resources Policy from 1997, which
stablished the granting of water usage rights and pricing
echanisms (Santos et al., 2013). From 2001 until 2015 there
ere nine states with laws and decrees speciﬁcally regulat-
ng PES, another six states with other legislation regulating
ES and eight states with draft bills regulating the topic. A
tudy hold in 2012 by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and
tatistics (IBGE) pointed out that 418 municipalities across the
ountry paid for ecosystem services conservation/provision
IBGE, 2013). Of these programs 47% were established by
unicipal law and 8% by decree.
In general, most of the PES programs and projects in Brazil
re supported by other environmental legislation, often regu-
ating speciﬁc funds for water and climate change mitigation
r adaptation (Santos et al., 2012; Tejeiro and Stanton, 2014).
oreover, several initiatives are just pilot projects developed
ith the support of non-governmental organizations and do
ot count with a proper regulation (Guedes and Seehusen,
011; Souza, 2011; Richards et al., 2015; Santos and Vivan,
012).
Most of the Brazilian state and municipal laws were pro-
ulgated after PES pilot projects. Yet, pilot projects that
imed to support the legal framework have experienced dis-
ontinuity in payments, change in scope in disregard of
revious contracts and change in payment criteria and doc-
ment requirements, what have caused loss of conﬁdence
ithin the communities involved (Lavrati et al., 2014; Tejeiro
nd Stanton, 2014; Richards et al., 2015). In Paraná state, for
xample, environmental restrictions established by the PES
aw prevented payments for conservation and restoration of
ermanent Preservation Areas (PPA) and Legal Reserve (LR),
esulting in the repeal of some articles of the original law
Paraná, 2014, 2012). In Espírito Santo, the partial repeal of law
o. 8.995/2008 substantially changed the focus and structure
f the PES in the state, causing mistrust between project prac-
itioners and local stakeholders (Tejeiro and Stanton, 2014).
The ﬁrst proposal for a National PES Policy was drafted in
007 (federal draft bill no. 792/2007). However, in recent years 1 4 (2 0 1 6) 132–136 133
this bill has received numerous appended draft bills dealing
with similar proposals, all of them very focused on income
transfer actions. In 2013 and 2015 emerged two independent
proposals (federal draft bills no. 276/2013 and no. 312/2015)
more  aligned with the 2007 draft bill emerged. Both priori-
tized results for improvement and maintenance of ecosystem
services. None of the bills has been approved.
Speciﬁcally the draft no. 792/2007 tried to balance environ-
mental and social aspects and is more  socially driven (Godecke
et al., 2014; Santos and Vivan, 2012; Santos et al., 2012). In
terms of equity and distribution for a national PES policy,
such balance could add important improvements (Corbera
et al., 2009; Muradian et al., 2010), but could also limit the
efﬁciency of conserving the biodiversity in large private prop-
erties (Engel et al., 2008). Another important aspect is related
to the restriction of payments for conservation and restoration
of Permanent Preservation Areas (PPA). PPA were established
by the National Forest Act (Brasil, 2012), that states the con-
servation of native vegetation covering hilltops, areas over 45◦,
in strips along rivers and around springs, and of areas above
1800 m height. In most of the Brazilian states, PES legislation
allows payments for conservation and restoration of PPA, and
most of the PES projects under development comprise mainly
these areas. If the original text of the law is maintained, a sig-
niﬁcant number of the PES projects will be in disagreement
with the mandates of the law.
The constraints observed in the federal PES proposal, and
in the examples brieﬂy mentioned, can also be seen in Santa
Catarina’s PES policy. A PES law enacted in 2010 was not imple-
mented in the following years and in 2014 an alternative
version of the law was prepared for the State Congress. Chal-
lenges faced since the law promulgation and recent strategies
developed for the PES policy implementation in Santa Catarina
state are presented next.
Santa  Catarina  PES  Policy  Framework:
constraints  to  get  off  the  ground
In 2010 Santa Catarina promulgated law no. 15.133 estab-
lishing the State PES Policy and Program. The policy
implementation is based on three sub-programs: water,
forests and protected areas. The reference value for PES pay-
ments is equivalent to the value of 30 sacks of corn per hectare
per year, according to the Minimum Price Guarantee Policy
(PGPM) established by the Federal Government.1 Further, the
payments are made according to three classes, Class I (100% of
the value), Class II (50%) or Class III (20%), depending on three
criteria: site location, farmers’ socioeconomic characteristics
and ecosystem service relevance within the landscape. Small-
scale farmers are to be prioritized for the payments under the
classes I and II. PES projects evaluation, payments classiﬁca-1 Current value of a sack of corn, according to the PGPM, is R$
17.67  (US $ 4.64). Therefore, the referenced value of 30 sacks of
corn corresponds to R$ 530.10 (US $ 139.28).
 v a ç ã134  n a t u r e z a & c o n s e r
from State Agencies. There is no restriction for payments for
areas under compliance (Santa Catarina, 2010).
The establishment of a reference value equivalent to 30
“sacks of corn” for PES payments was a result of political
pressure coming from the State Agriculture and Livestock Fed-
eration and the deputies representing small-scale farmers.
Usually, farmers charge this value for land lease operations,
although land opportunity costs can be much lower (CEPA,
2015). However, determining a reference value disregards
important aspects central to any PES program, as the fund-
ing available and the structure of the funding mechanism, the
land opportunity cost variation, the willingness to pay and to
accept from the potential beneﬁciaries and providers, respec-
tively, and the nature of the ecosystem service.
The deﬁnition of classes for payments depends upon
criteria for measuring environmental or ecosystem services
quality. These criteria would be deﬁned in a speciﬁc regu-
lation supposed to be published 90 days after the law has
been issued, but it was never presented at the State Congress.
Moreover, the composition of the small technical committee
responsible for analyzing all PES projects and for its clas-
siﬁcation, depending on their environmental performance,
disregards the project location, sub-program classiﬁcation and
the committee members’ knowledge about the region (ﬁeld
experience) and ecosystem service generated.
For the three following years, after the PES law promulga-
tion, efforts to establish PES projects under the umbrella of the
state legislation were unsuccessful. In 2013, the State Board
of Climate Change gathered representatives from institutions
and specialists knowledgeable about PES and created a work-
ing group to lead the reform of the law. The working group
identiﬁed several barriers, including:
– Institutional – the State as unique executor and the lack of
infrastructure for the analysis of documents and generation
of contracts with ecosystem service providers;
– Economic – ﬁnancial resources ﬂow with restrictions due to
bureaucratic processes related to public expenditure, result-
ing in difﬁculty to maintain the annual payments for the
contracts generated; and,
– Technical – lack of human resources affecting the potential
scale of the program, standardization of the PES payment
value and overlapping of the subprograms.
Based on these constraints, a draft bill of law no.
15.133/2010 was consolidated and made available on a plat-
form for online public consultation for 30 days during May
2014. The draft bill proposes the improvement and correction
of the restrictions highlighted above; improves and clariﬁes
important concepts and provides the tools that would enable
the law implementation by deﬁning more  general guidelines
that could be adapted to variations at the state and the local
levels. The main changes of the draft bill to current law2
include the following (Table 1):2 For more information and details, consulting
https://sgpe.sea.sc.gov.br, process DSUST no. 290/2014. o 1 4 (2 0 1 6) 132–136
Political  challenges  for  PES  policy
implementation  in  Santa  Catarina
There are several challenges associated to the implementa-
tion of public policies by the State. Some of them include:
compliance with different political interests and economic
sectors that are directly affected; discontinuity of projects
related to political parties and their permanence in the gov-
ernment; and difﬁculty of providing the necessary ﬁnancial
resources over a long period of time that are associated with a
large and often excessive bureaucracy involved with disburs-
ing these resources. The development and implementation
of a public policy focused on ecosystem service provision-
ing becomes crucial for an economy heavily dependent on
the ﬁrst sector, resulting in direct beneﬁts to the farmers and
to the maintenance of their agricultural activities (Martinelli
and Filoso, 2009; Martinelli et al., 2010a; Power, 2010). Like-
wise, historically, nature conservation strategies have been
seen as “obstacles to progress”, causing innumerous conﬂicts
of interests (Martinelli et al., 2010b; Tollefson, 2010). However,
agricultural production strongly relies on ecosystem services
provision and PES (Ango et al., 2014; Parron et al., 2015; Power,
2010). If conﬂicts uphold ES conservation and agricultural
activities in opposing sides and interests, the facts are being
misconducted and misinterpreted.
As a relatively recent approach, PES policies in Brazil are
facing difﬁculties of being developed at municipal and state
levels (Pagiola et al., 2012; Zanella et al., 2014). Additionally,
the lack of federal law applied to PES increases the legal
uncertainty of how this issue should be treated in a coun-
try of continental dimensions (Santos et al., 2012; Tejeiro and
Stanton, 2014).
Many questions arise when planning a PES policy. For
example, how can a PES policy be designed to guarantee long
term funding, with permanent and positive results for ecosys-
tem services provision? How to suitably address ecosystem
service conservation or any policy under the scarce technical
capacity and the discontinuation of actions undertaken by the
local and federal government?
Aiming to overcome funding shortage, PES should be
supported by mixed sources (public and private) mainly by
implementing taxation for negative environmental external-
ities. The limited technical capacity and lack of stability in
the public sector has to be focused by the establishment
of programs developed in partnership with different stake-
holders. Under this arrangement, public sector would be
attributed as regulator and supporter more  than an executive
player.
In Santa Catarina, current challenges for effective imple-
mentation of the state PES Policy are mostly related to the
approval and publication of the draft bill. Actually, the bill is
being analyzed by the Governor and should be sent to the
State Congress for evaluation. In the Congress, the different
political interests may result in a modiﬁcation of the text in
order to address the demands of speciﬁc economic sectors, as
the Agriculture. Due to the preferences previously showed by
deputies in restricting the PES payments only for small-scale
farmers and to allocate the payments primarily in regions with
low human index development in disregard of environmental
n a t u r e z a & c o n s e r v a ç ã o 1 4 (2 0 1 6) 132–136 135
Table 1 – Comparison between actual and the draft bill for PES in Santa Catarina State.
Actual PES law 15.133/2010 Draft bill Impacts expected with changes
The State Government as unique
executor and funder
The  State Government as technical and
economic PES supporter
Governance decentralization should improve
implementation and diversify PES funders
Standardization of the minimum PES
payment value (30 sacks of corn per
hectare per year)
Establishment of an indicative formula to
value Ecosystem Services based on Oásis
methodology (Young and de Bakker, 2014)
Improves the methodology for the payments’
value calculation based on a validated formula
(Oasis). The allowance to use other
methodologies for valuation enables each
program to be adjusted to its own governance
system and to the local ecological characteristics
3 Subprograms Without subprograms categories It avoids the overlapping of programs, as
ecosystem services are commonly linked to a
given ecosystem and usually appear together in
time and space (Berry et al., 2015)
Payment classiﬁcation No classiﬁcation by an economic value
deﬁnition
The Oasis formula subsidizes the payments’
value calculation based on a large range of
ecological criteria applied to each site, which is
much more complete than the criteria listed in
the law.
Prioritization for small-scale farmers for
full payments and per Subprogram
No  prioritization of farmers’
socioeconomic categories
The change results in equal treatment for
farmers, independently of their social status. In
one hand, it makes the program attractive to all.
However, in other hand, it can rise the
payments’ values of the programs
A committee, formed just by ﬁve
representatives from State Public
Indication for the establishing of local
management committees to be regulated
progr
The measure promotes a great improvement in

































environmental services in theory and practice: an overview ofAgencies, to manage all program
execution.
according to each PES 
spects and priorities, technical and scientiﬁc consultancy has
o be advocated. This would inform on the number of farm-
rs that would be elected to get PES, on the environmental
riorities to be addressed, and on the cost-beneﬁt between
he payments and the ES conservation. This would also ham-
er political and legal issues of being decided disregarding the
nvironmental issues, such as the priorities areas for ES con-
ervation and, mostly the effective protection of ES to each
rea elected to receive the payments.
Once the PES was designed facing the crucial environ-
ental issues (listed above), combined to political and legal
hallenges to overcome, the next steps would include the
eﬁnition of clear criteria for prioritizing areas within the
tate, structuring of environmental assessments in order to
valuate ecosystem services provision and quality, identifying
roviders and beneﬁciaries, deﬁning the monitoring parame-
ers and articulating stakeholders.
There is a great local expectation that the PES law will be
ffectively implemented in Santa Catarina. This could be an
pportunity to properly address the contend involving envi-
onmental conservation and the National Forest Act, recently
hanged and still in debate, but that compromised ES sup-
ort for human wellbeing and for agricultural activities. The
tate Agriculture and Livestock Federation is expecting farm-
rs to be compensated for restoring and conserving forested
reas. Farmers expect to be compensated for setting aside
orested areas and for restoring ecological susceptible areas in
heir properties. Natural Scientists are expecting that impor-
ant natural areas are restored and preserved, guarantying the
ong-term maintenance of ecological processes. However, for
ddressing such demands, the changes proposed in the bill are
rucial and the most plausible way to get the Santa Catarina
ES policy ﬁnally off the ground.am/scheme
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